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Home Warranty
(continued from page 63)

ed that arbitration would be final
or binding. Only then could the
court rely on Association rules that
allow for entry of a confirmation
judgment. National contended
that although Association rules
make an arbitration award confirmable, they cannot, by themselves, make the award final.
The appellate court rejected National's position and stated that it
would not require the presence of
magic words such as final or binding before enforcing arbitration
awards. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that courts generally look
for a reference to Association rules
to determine finality and only
when such guideposts are absent,
rely upon the presence of words
like final and binding.
National also argued that the
warranty contract expressly rebutted the Association Rule 26(c) presumption of consent to entry of
confirmation judgment. According
to National, the warranty contract's stipulation that the arbitration process was a prerequisite to
litigation was evidence that the
parties anticipated the possibility
of future litigation. Therefore, the
arbitration decision was not binding.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed,
finding that the language of this
contract provision was probably
left over from the days when courts
were hostile to arbitration clauses.
Drafters of arbitration agreements,
therefore, used this language to
insure that parties completed the
arbitration process before suing in
federal court. The Fourth Circuit
found that, in the warranty contract in dispute, this language applied only to a court's ability to
enter a confirmation judgment or a
litigant's ability to use a final arbitration award as part of some
larger litigation.
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's award of
damages to Rainwater for the cost
of repairing the foundation.
Monica A. Murray
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Consumers Injured By
Meat Processor's False
Advertising Receive
Class Action
Certification Under
Lanham Act
In Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc.,
138 F.R.D. 444 (D.N.J. 1991), the
United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey certified
a consumer class action under the
Lanham Act for injuries caused by
false advertising but denied similar
class certification under the New
Jersey Racketeering Act, the federal Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations statute, the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,
and common law fraud.

two subclasses. The first subclass
consisted of all persons who purchased Sandy Mac's ham products,
removed the packaging supplied by
Sandy Mac, and thereafter resold
the ham in a modified condition.
Included within the first subclass
were all deli and restaurant owners
and large purchasers that sold the
ham products over the counter.
The second subclass consisted of
all ultimate consumers of Sandy
Mac's ham products who purchased the products on a cost-perpound basis for home consumption.
Consumers of restaurant or deli
sandwiches who purchased the
product for immediate consumption were not included in either
subclass.

Background

Consumer Standing Under the
Lanham Act

Sandy Mac, Inc. ("Sandy Mac"),
a federally inspected meat plant
that is no longer in business, formally processed ham products for
resale through distributors and
wholesalers nationwide. From
1975 to 1987, Sandy Mac sold ham
products that it fraudulently represented as meeting the United
States Department of Agriculture
standards. Sandy Mac's ham products failed to meet U.S.D.A standards because the amount of water
added to the ham exceeded both
the amount represented on the
label and that which was permitted
by law. In 1989, Sandy Mac plead
guilty to criminal charges arising
out of its fraudulent conduct.
In 1990, Zane Maguire ("Maguire"), a restaurant owner who
purchased ham products from
Sandy Mac during the relevant
time period, sued Sandy Mac on
behalf of a group of ham product
purchasers. Maguire asserted
claims against Sandy Mac under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1125(a); the New Jersey Racketeering Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:41-4
(West 1982); the federal Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations statute, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c);
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-1 - 56:8-4
(West 1989); and common law
fraud.
The proposed class of ham product purchasers was divided into

Before the district court reached
the issue of class certification, it
decided whether the consumers actually had standing to bring a Lanham action. The first issue relevant
to standing was if the Lanham Act
created a right of action for people
who were not competitors.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1125(a)(2), provides that, "any
person who, on or in any connection with any goods...or any container for goods, uses in commerce
any ... false or misleading representation of fact, which . .. in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities ... of his
or her goods shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such an act." Sandy
Mac argued that consumers could
not sue under the Lanham Act
because the Act only created a right
of action for competitors.
The federal courts disagree
about whether the Lanham Act
provides protection to consumers.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which
controls in this case, has held that
the Lanham Act should be broadly
construed to provide a remedy for
non-competitors. Thus, the district
court held that consumers have a
right to relief under the Lanham
Act.
The second issue the court exVolume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
amined with respect to standing
was whether the consumers had a
reasonable interest in being protected against false advertising.
The reasonable interest test was
adopted by the Third Circuit to
prevent frivolous Lanham Act
claims from flooding the federal
courts. In this case, the district
court found that consumers did
have a reasonable interest in being
protected from commercial misrepresentations.
Certification of the Class Action
Under the federal rules, a proposed class of individuals must
meet the following prerequisites
for class certification: (1) the class
must be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable; (2)
there must be questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) the
claims of the representative parties
must be typical of the claims of the
class; and (4) the representative
parties must be able to fairly and
adequately protect the interests of
the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
In this case, the district court
found that the numerosity requirement was met because the proposed class apparently consisted of
over 100 geographically dispersed
members. The district court also
found that common questions of
law or fact were present in each of
the five causes of action.
Sandy Mac did not contest that
Maguire's claims were typical of
the proposed class's claims. Therefore, the court assumed that Maguire's claims were typical in that
his recovery depended on legal
claims that were typical of the
class.
In examining the fourth requirement, adequacy of representation,
the district court applied a twopart test adopted by the Third
Circuit. First, Maguire's attorney
had to be qualified, experienced,
and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation. Second, Maguire could not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.
Sandy Mac contested the second
issue; it argued that a conflict of
interest existed because the consumer subclass had a potential
claim against the retailer subclass
who sold Sandy Mac's product.
The district court found no conVolume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

flict of interest because the subclasses had no pending actions
against each other. Also, no potential liability existed because, theoretically, the subclasses did not
interact in the sale and purchase of
Sandy Mac's ham products. The
court found no potential liability
because Maguire was a restaurant
owner and the proposed class excluded restaurant and deli customers. Accordingly, the district court
concluded that Maguire was an
adequate class representative.
Although the class met these
prerequisites, it had to satisfy two
additional federal rule requirements. First, Maguire had to show
that common questions predominated over individual issues. In
determining whether Maguire met
this requirement, the court examined each of the five claims individually.
To recover under either the state
or federal racketeering statutes, the
class would have to establish an
injury resulting from Sandy Mac's
violation and a causal connection
between the injury and the violation. Although proof of the racketeering violation raised a common
question, proof of injury did not;
each member of the class would
have to show the unique circumstances surrounding his or her individual injury. Therefore, the court

ANNOUNCEMENT
Pocket Guide
to Food Additives
Consumers may obtain
an inexpensive reference
guide to food additives.
The guide is a 62 page
dictionary of food additives, their primary uses,
their safety ratings, and
their harmful effects.
For a copy of this comprehensive guide, send
$1.95 plus $1.50 shipping
to: VPS Publishing,
16102 Whitecap Lane,
Huntington, CA 92649
(714-840-0812).

concluded that common questions
of Sandy Mac's racketeering violation would not predominate over
the individual questions of injury
and causation.
For the state consumer fraud
claim, the class would have to
prove an ascertainable loss resulting from violation of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud statute.
For the common law fraud claim,
the class would have to show a
material misrepresentation, intent
to cause reliance, and detrimental
reliance. Although violation of the
statute and misrepresentations
were common questions, injury
and reliance were individual questions. Thus, like the racketeering
statutes, the individual questions
of fact predominated in the fraud
claims.
The Lanham Act claim, unlike
the other causes of action, did not
require proof of an injury; the class
needed only to prove that Sandy
Mac violated the Act. The district
court found that the violation of
the Lanham Act was a common
question which predominated over
individual issues. Thus, the Lanham Act claim was the only cause
of action which met the first additional federal rule requirement.
In addition to showing that common questions predominated over
individual questions, the proposed
class also had to show that the class
action was superior to alternative
methods of resolving the dispute.
Sandy Mac argued that the class
action was not the superior method
because the sheer size of the proposed class made it unmanageable.
Sandy Mac maintained that problems would arise in attempting to
identify and notify allegedly millions of potential class members. In
determining whether a class action
was the superior method of resolving the dispute, the district court
considered the interests of the judicial system, the potential class
members, Maguire, the attorneys,
the public at large, and Sandy Mac.
The court found that judicial economy would best be served by certifying the class. The court also
found that because the potential
amount of recovery by individual
class members was small, legal
action would not be financially
(continued on page 66)
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False Advertising
(continued from page 65)

feasible absent the class action.
Thus, the class action would allow
the individuals to have their day in
court.
Kalina M. Tulley

Iowa Consumer Fraud
Act Prohibits Earning
Money By Referrals
Rather Than By Product
Sales
In State of Iowa v. Santa Rosa
Sales and Marketing, Inc., 475
N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1991), the Iowa
Supreme Court held that the Iowa
Consumer Fraud Act prohibited a
company from earning money by
engaging in referral sales, which
motivate buyers to become salespersons and recruit others, rather
than by generating the sales of
products. The court also held that
the company deceived its brokers
and salespersons by misrepresenting the legality of its silver coin
sales program.
Background
Santa Rosa Sales and Marketing, Inc. ("Santa Rosa") is a California corporation engaged nationwide in selling contracts for Silver
Eagle coins. The coins are United
States currency with a face value of
one dollar that Santa Rosa offered
at three for $80 or twenty for $500.
The coins are also sold nationally
in coin shops, banks, and over
cable television for prices ranging
from $6 to $65 per coin. Charles R.
Groeschel ("Groeschel") was Santa Rosa's founder, chairman of the
board, former president, and person responsible for marketing procedures. Groeschel and his wife
were the sole shareholders of Santa
Rosa.
Santa Rosa's sales were made by
brokers or salespersons who sold
contracts; purchasers of contracts
could become brokers or salespersons themselves. Brokers were distinguished from salespersons in
that brokers received training and
ongoing continuing education
66

from Santa Rosa, but salespersons
did not. Brokers were contractual
employees who were required to
comply with Santa Rosa's written
policies. After a broker completed
a presentation, prospective clients
were given the opportunity to buy
coins or sign up to be salespersons.
First-time purchasers bought
one or more starter contracts at a
cost of either $80 or $500. The
purchase agreement for those
choosing to become salespeople
contained a provision requiring
twelve completed sales of coin contracts before they would be paid.
Salespersons who did not sell
twelve completed coin contracts
within thirty days were removed
from the referral program, and the
initial $80 or $500 payment became a direct purchase of the
coins. Purchasers of coin contracts
were given the option to never take
possession of the coins. In theory,
Santa Rosa bought back the coins
that purchasers never received, resold them, and then sent the purchasers cash. Eighty-five percent of
Iowans who purchased contracts
opted not to take possession of the
coins.

ANNOUNCEMENT
Top Consumer Scams

of 1991
The Alliance Against Fraud in
Telemarketing has published a list

of the top ten consumer scams in
1991 in the United States. In order,
they are:
1. Postcard Guaranteed Prize
Offers
2. Advance Fee Loans
3. Fraudulent 900 Number Promotions
4. Precious Metal Investment
Schemes
5. Toll Call Fraud (Con artists
use binoculars to read calling card
numbers of travelers placing long-

distance phone calls from airports
and train stations.)
6. Headline Grabbers (For example, thousands of people agreed
to let military personnel use their
long distance calling card numbers
to call back to the United States.)
7. Direct Debit from Checking

Accounts

8. Phony Yellow Page Invoices
9. Phony Credit Card Pro-

motions
10. Collectors' Items

See Alliance Against Fraud in

Telemarketing, Fall, pp. 1-2 (1991).

Trial Court
The State of Iowa sued Santa
Rosa alleging that the company
violated Iowa's Consumer Fraud
Statute, Iowa Code 714.16 (1987),
by committing unlawful practices
of: (1) referral sales; (2) misrepresentations; (3) violations of the
Door-to-Door Sales Act, Iowa
Code ch. 82; and (4) violations of
the lottery statute, Iowa Code
725.12 (1987).
The District Court, Polk County, Iowa enjoined Santa Rosa's
marketing program and held the
company liable for a restitution
fund of $196,463 to be administered by the State. The court ordered Iowa to make restitution to
Santa Rosa consumers from the
fund and deposit any remainder
with the Iowa Consumer Education and Litigation Fund. Additionally, the court assessed a civil
penalty and prejudgment interest
and held Groeschel personally liable. Santa Rosa appealed to the
Iowa Supreme Court.
Statute Prohibits Referral Sales
Although the statutory language
of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Statute does not contain the word
referral, the Iowa Supreme Court
has interpreted 714.16(2)(b) as
prohibiting referral sales. Generally in a referral sales program, the
seller represents that the buyer's
purchase price will be reduced or
that the buyer will receive a commission by referring other prospects to the seller. Santa Rosa
argued that its program was not an
illegal referral sales plan because a
salesperson's compensation was
determined by the sale of coins and
not by the recruitment of other
salespersons.
However, consumer testimony,
broker training materials, sales
documents, and actual broker presentations, combined with data
showing that only a fraction of
Iowa purchasers opted to take Silver Eagle coins, established that
Iowa purchasers were not motivated by the desire to own Santa
Rosa's Silver Eagle coins, but rather, to make easy money by recruiting others. Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Santa Rosa's moneyVolume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

